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Public health practitioners require measures to
evaluate how vulnerable populations are to diseases,
especially for zoonoses (i.e. diseases transmitted
from animal to humans) given their pandemic
potential. These measures would be valuable to
support strategic and operational decision making
and allocation of resources. Whereas vulnerability is
well defined for natural hazards, for public health
threats the concept remains undetermined. Here
we developed ew methodologies to: i) quantify
the impact of zoonotic diseases and the capacity
of countries to cope with these diseases, and ii)
combined these two measures (impact and capacity)
into one overall vulnerability indicator. As example
we focused on the vulnerability of Nigeria and Sierra
Leone to Lassa Fever and Ebola. We developed a
simple analytical form that can be used to estimate
vulnerability scores for different spatial units of
interest, e.g. countries or regions. We showed how
some populations can be highly vulnerable despite
low impact threats. We finally outlined future research
to more comprehensively inform vulnerability with
the incorporation of relevant factors depicting local
heterogeneities ( e.g. bio-physical and socio-economic
factors).
c© The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and
source are credited.
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There is a general consensus that the accelerating changes to Earth’s natural systems pose
significant threats to global human health [1,2]. Identifying populations vulnerable to these
threats and assessing relevant mitigating strategies are two important priorities for the scientific
community, public health practitioners, international organizations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO) and relevant national government agencies [3]. Although the term is
sometime used in a loosely way, vulnerability is a well-established concept in the field of climate
change and disaster risk reduction/management [4–6].
In contrast, integration of vulnerability in the control of infectious diseases is still relatively
new although the literature on the subject is growing, especially due to the impact of climate
change on vector-borne and food/water-borne infections [7–12]. Here we focus on vulnerability
to infectious diseases only. Specifically, by disease vulnerability we refer to the ability of a
community (e.g. a country) to limit the spread of infectious diseases [3]. The definition comprises
two important concepts: disease impact, and adaptive capacity, i.e. the ability of the community to
cope with the disease. Below we will introduce an ‘operational definition’ (i.e. a definition in terms
of the procedure to measure the variable of interest) for these concepts, but we can anticipate that
vulnerability to infectious diseases is expected to be affected by changes in economic development
(e.g. change in health-care infrastructures [3,13]), shift in socio-cultural practices (e.g. changes
in the funeral practices in West Africa following the Ebola epidemics [14,15]), variation in the
demographic structure of a population (e.g. increase in the proportion of older people [15]), trade
and travel patterns (e.g. incursion of Aedes albopictus in south Europe due to trade of international
tyres and lucky bamboo (Dracaena braunii) [16,17] followed by outbreaks of Chikungunya fever in
north-eastern Italy in 2007 [18,19], and autochthonous cases of dengue fever in 2010 in France
[20], Croatia [21], and Madeira in 2012 [22,23]), and immunization related phenomena (e.g.
increasing anti-vaccine movements [24]) etc. This is not surprising, considering the impact of
socio-economic, environmental and ecological factors on infectious diseases [25].
Ebola and Lassa fever are two illuminating examples of the intricate interactions between
disease vulnerability and these broad drivers. Ebola and Lassa fever are zoonotic, viral
haemorrhagic fevers endemic in Central and West Africa [26–28].
There are four pathogenic strains of Ebola virus (Zaire, Sudan, Tai Forest, and Bundibugyo)
causing Ebola virus disease (EVD) with a high case fatality rate in diagnosed patients [29]. Fruit
bats have been suggested to be the reservoir of Ebola virus [30], however, other candidates might
play an important role either as an reservoir or amplifying host [28,31]. Socio-economics factors,
e.g. bush meat hunting, enhance opportunities for bat-to-human interactions, and therefore
spillovers. Behaviour, e.g. family interactions [32], funeral practices [14] and healthcare responses
[33] further impact on the epidemiology of the disease.
Lassa fever is caused by Lassa fever virus (LASV), an enveloped RNA virus of the
Arenaviridae. According to one estimation [34] there are 300, 000 cases of the disease each
year in West Africa, and some 3, 000 deaths, although the calculation is highly uncertain. Since
the identification of LASV, human-to-human transmission has been documented in several
nosocomial outbreaks ( [35] and references therein) leading to the initial perception that the
virus was both highly contagious and virulent [36]. Soon after, however, its zoonotic origin was
recognized and Mastomys natalensis, one of the most common African rodents, was identified
as the reservoir of the virus [37]. As the risk of nosocomial transmission was shown to be
dramatically reduced by using simple barrier nursing method ( [35] and references therein),
the general consensus has shifted towards the idea that the disease is primarily transmitted by
the Mastomys natalensis, with human-to-human transmission limited to nosocomial transmission.
In the last few years, this narrative started to be challenged, with more evidence of other
host reservoirs [38] and further indication that human-to-human transmission might play an
important role [35]. This appear to be in contrast with recent studies in Nigeria [39,40], according
to which extensive human-to-human transmission does not occur, although, occasional, possible
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cases of human-to-human transmission have been detected. It is important to emphasize, that
according to [35] most cases have zoonotic origins, interspersed with cases (about 20% although
the estimate is affected by uncertainty) ascribable to human-to-human transmission arising from
a few super-spreaders [35] (and therefore ladder-like genetic structure of the phylogenetic tree
is not expected [39]). Another important aspect to be considered in future studies is the role
of asymptomatic cases (in about 80% of cases symptoms are mild and are undiagnosed [41]);
samples from asymptomatic cases are in general not included in the viral sequencing and this
might affect the conclusions of phylogenetic analysis. The impact of Lassa fever and Ebola as well
as communities’ adaptive capacity, and therefore their vulnerability to the diseases, are expected
to be affected by a wide range of environmental, biological, ecological, socio-economic and
political drivers. Examples of such drivers for impact are: demographic pressure, human mobility,
the practice of burning fields after harvesting (driving M. natalensis towards villages), interaction
with wildlife via bush-meat hunting, seasonal crowding of miners in dwellings etc. Examples of
such drivers for adaptive capacity are income, infrastructure such as hospitals, network of family
support etc. Current approaches to the assessment of population vulnerability to infectious
diseases suffer from limitations: they tend to be qualitative in nature, they are usually structured
in an ad hoc fashion based on a particular threat, and their transparency is often challenged when
formulated as complex integrated assessment models [42].
Here we propose to address some of these limitations. We focus on the formulation of a
mechanistic model to measure vulnerability, the model is structured in a way that the complex
range of factors depicting local heterogeneities can be incorporated into the model. The model
can also be dynamically updated as new information becomes available.
2. Material and Methods
(a) Formal definitions
Vulnerability (V ) is formally defined as the ratio of impact, I, and adaptive capacity, AC (see [6,43]





In our context we use the expected number of infected cases at time t as operational definition of
impact (representing the burden of zoonotic diseases on a given population) and we use the
expected number of recovered cases out of all infected at time t as operational definition of adaptive
capacity (representing the ability of such population to cope with the impact of such disease). We
distinguished two situations: ‘severe cases’ and ‘general cases’. For the former, we do not take into
account individuals who naturally recover from the disease as they do not require costly resource
such as hospitalization; we also made the underlying assumption that health seeking behaviour,
resulting in hospitalization for which we have data, occurs only in severe cases. Asymptomatic
cases, assumed to be not detected, are not taken into account in the definition of vulnerability
for severe cases. Individuals who naturally recovered are taken into account in the definition of
vulnerability for general cases as the infection status will result in loss of working days, personal
cost for medicines etc. Here and throughout the paper we use the suffix sev and gen to represent
these situations.
(b) Epidemiological Scenarios
We consider the following epidemiological scenarios. The rationale for this choice was the
epidemiological relevance of these scenarios and the natural mathematical progression, by
extending the simplest model for pure spillover events to more complex ones (table 1 and
Supplementary Material).
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• Spillover events with no human-to-human transmission and no variation in the number of
susceptibles. This scenario exemplifies a situation such as rare infections of pathogens with
no or limited human-to-human transmission, e.g. rabies virus infection, in a large pool of
susceptibles for which changes in their number are negligible.
• Spillover events with no human-to-human transmission and depletion of susceptibles. The
second scenario is when the pool of susceptibles is limited, and infections from spillover
events result in either the death of the hosts or in its immunity. As susceptibles are
continuously depleted the rate of infections is reducing with time and the epidemics
is self-correcting [44]. This scenario exemplifies a situation such as a long chain of
spillover events in small, isolated communities (e.g. Brucellosis in a community of
pastoral herders).
• Spillover events with human-to-human transmission and depletion of susceptibles. The third
scenario is similar to the situation above with additional contribution of human-to-
human transmission. If the contribution of human-to-human transmission is small,
resulting in a basic reproductive number less than one, the epidemiological scenario
is referred to as a stuttering chain. As a human infection triggers other infections
the rate of infections due to human-human transmission increases with time. In the
absence of depletion of susceptibles the epidemic is self-exciting; otherwise the two
mechanisms, self-exciting and self-correction, co-exist [44]. This scenario exemplifies a
situation such as Ebola for which human-to-human transmission plays a dominant role,
MERS Coronavirus [45], or Lassa fever due to human-to-human transmissions arising
from super-spreading events [35].
• Multiple (two) diseases. In general diseases do not occur in isolation and the simultaneous
occurrence of multiple epidemics is expected to have a large impact on communities
vulnerability. For instance, due to the additional strain on healthcare facilities and
resources, as happened in Sierra Leone when the Kenema government hospital Lassa
fever Team mobilized to establish Ebola virus surveillance and diagnostic capabilities
during the 2013-2016 Ebola outbreak [46]) and then were unable to respond to Lassa.
Interactions among infections may also affect the burden of diseases. For example,
several studies has indicated an association between HIV infection and other sexually
transmitted diseases [47].
• Extension to larger regions (e.g. country level). The model is formulated at the smallest
spatial resolution, which is dictated by ecological and epidemiological factors. For
example, for Lassa fever the smallest spatial unit is a region of size comparable to the
dispersal range of Mastomys nataliensis and where the assumption of uniform mixing
(everyone is in contact with each other) is valid. In some instances, it may be more
relevant, however, to know the vulnerability of a larger geographic region, region or
administrative unit such as a province or a country. The underlying model (based on a
Poisson processes) can be readily extended to measure vulnerability at larger scale (as the
sum of two independent Poisson distributed random variables is still a Poisson random
variable).
(c) Modelling Approach
Based on this definition 2.1 and building on a mathematical model for spillover events (as Poisson
processes) and stuttering chain (as Hawkes processes) [44], we derived analytical expressions
for vulnerability for the epidemiological scenarios as described above. Below we show the
mathematical derivation for the simple case of vulnerability to diseases with no human-to-
human transmission. Mathematical derivations of the more complex situations follow similar
steps and are presented in the Supplementary Material. Following [44], spillover events can be
treated as a Poisson process, and complex drivers are incorporated in the functional form of the
rate, λ, of the Poisson process. More precisely, in the simplest scenario the human population is
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uniformly subjected to random and independent (direct or mediated) contacts with the animal
reservoir. Only a fraction of these contacts, equal to the infection prevalence of the reservoir, are
a potential source of infection. We also distinguish the detected infections from the undetected
ones. Accordingly, we assume:
λ= xNH ηR(NR)PrR(NR)χR + (1− x)NHηR(NR)PrR(NR)χR =NHηR(NR)PrR(NR)χR (2.2)
where x is the proportion of detected cases; NH is the human population size size of the
geographical unit of interest, e.g. total number of people in a village; ηR(NR) is a measure of
exposure; PrR(NR) is the prevalence of the infected reservoir; both exposure and prevalence
are expected to depend on the reservoir population size NR; χR is a parameter combining
two complex mechanisms: the ability of the reservoir to excrete a suitable dosage of the
agent/pathogen/hazard and the human response to it. We refer to this parameter as infection-
response efficiency. We assumed that all detected cases results in some intervention. Similarly, we
assume that the probability of a person recovering, i.e. the adaptive capacity AC, is given by a
Poisson process with rate φsev or φgen depending on weather we are considering the situation
for severe cases or general cases. Namely:
Adaptive Capacity for severe cases. In this case the rate φsev(t) of the Poisson process is given by:
φsev = xλγH (2.3)
where γH is the probability that a person recovers following some kind of intervention (e.g.
treatment, hospitalization, other forms of healthcare aid), x is the proportion of detected cases.
Adaptive Capacity for general cases. In this case the rate φgen(t) of the Poisson process is given by:
φgen = (1− x)λγ + xλγH (2.4)
where γ is the probability that a person naturally recovers without intervention.
For the severe cases scenario, the impact I is represented by the fraction of detected infected cases











In the general cases scenario the impact I is represented by the total number of infected cases λ









(1− x)γ + xγH
. (2.6)
Thus, the method requires estimates of the i) probability of recovering following intervention
γH ii) probability of recovering naturally γ, and iii) probability of detection x. The probability of





where D is the cumulative number of cases detected during a certain time T and F is the
cumulative number of fatal cases out of the detected ones during the time T . Here we treat any
non-fatal cases as recovered, henceD − F represents the number of recovered cases at time T and
γH is the proportion of recovered cases, out of all detected cases, at time T . Confidence interval
around vulnerability measures were calculated based on a Poisson log-linear model for the ratio
of two independent Poisson rates [48]. The probability of naturally recover could be obtained
by survival/mortality data if information on the undetected, including asymptomatic, cases are
available (see [41]). The probability of detection x can be inferred by the literature, surveillance
data or other modelling exercises.
Alternatively, the relevant parameters, for example the probability of recovering following
intervention γH , could be further modelled using other proxies such as number of hospital beds,
income etc.
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(d) Case Studies and Data
We studied the vulnerability of Sierra Leone to Ebola, and the vulnerability of Sierra Leone
and Nigeria to Lassa fever. We used data (number of laboratory confirmed cases and number
of deaths) from the 2013-2016 Ebola epidemics in Sierra Leone, Lassa fever epidemic in Sierra
Leone during 2008-2012, and from the 2017-2018 Lassa fever epidemic in Nigeria. Data were were
extracted from publicly available repositories [49–51] and from Kenema Government hospital in
Sierra Leone (available from [35]).
Results
Some Simple Expressions for Vulnerability
Table 1 shows the analytical expressions of vulnerability for the general and severe situations for
some key epidemiological scenarios. Accordingly, we showed that vulnerability can be simply
estimated as the inverse of the probability of recovering. For the severe situation this simply
reduces to one parameter, γH , representing the probability of recovering following intervention.
For the general situation the probability of recovering is a linear (additive) combination of the
fraction of detected cases × the probability of recovering following intervention and the fraction
of undetected cases × the probability of natural recovery, γ. The functional form of vulnerability
is not dependent on the number of diseased case; this is strictly valid when the system under
consideration (e.g. a country) is able to cope with any magnitude of disease burden and the
probability of recovering is not affected by the number of diseased cases. When the number of
diseased cases overcomes a certain threshold there will no longer be beds in hospital and/or
medical personnel available. In this case, the functional form of vulnerability would still scale as
the inverse of the probability of recovering, but this would be a function of the number of diseased
cases, i.e. γH→ γH(λ), rather than a simple constant.
In the co-presence of multiple diseases the analytical expression for vulnerability becomes
a function incorporating i) the sum of the two disease cases, ii) the probabilities of recovering
and iii) the fraction of detection for the different diseases. In this situation the functional form
of vulnerability depends on the number of cases of the two specific diseases, with relevant
parameters (e.g. proportion of detection and probability of recovering for the two diseases) being
weighted by factors representing the relative burden of disease A and disease B (Supplementary
Material). This reflects the fact that the diseases can have a differential effect on impact and
adaptive capacity (for instance, when a country can cope better with one disease rather than the
other). As above, in a more general situation the probability of recovering should be substituted
with the adequate function of the number of cases for both diseases.
Extension of the model at larger spatial resolution also leads to a transparent expression for
vulnerability, which is simply the ratio of the overall impact (i.e. the sum of the impacts for each
spatial unit) and overall adaptive capacity (i.e. the sum of the adaptive capacity for each spatial
unit).
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the terms in the rate λ (e.g. the reservoir population
size NR and the prevalence of the infected reservoir PrR(NR)) can be seasonal (leading to an
in-homogeneous Poisson process) and stochastic (leading to Cox processes, and if the rate λ is
a gamma-distributed variable, the Cox process is described by a negative binomial distribution
[44]). Similar consideration can be applied to the adaptive capacity and in turn to the vulnerability,
i.e. estimations of vulnerability are expected to be seasonal and stochastic.
Vulnerability to Lassa Fever and Ebola in Nigeria and Sierra Leone
Figure 1 shows the vulnerability to Lassa Fever during the 2017-2018 epidemic in Nigeria,
and for 2008-2012 in Sierra Leone. Estimations for both the general and severe situations are
presented. For Nigeria vulnerability decreases with time reaching the asymptotic values between
Page 6 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb








































































1.25 and 1.5 (severe situation) and between 1.25 and 1.3 (general situation). Note that according
to our definition, a vulnerability equal to 1 means that all infected cases recover. In Sierra
Leone, vulnerabilities increase with time after 2010 and tend to be slightly higher than the
corresponding values for Nigeria. The vulnerabilities for the general situation tend to be lower
than the vulnerabilities for the severe situation. The vulnerability to Lassa fever in Nigeria shows
a marked decrease during the time of the epidemics compared with the vulnerability for Sierra
Leone (1). The decreasing trend in Nigeria is largely driven by the fact that the number of fatal
cases decrease with time, although the number of detected cases also increase. The reasons are
not entirely clear, but we suspect that this is due to the fact that Lassa fever in Sierra Leone might
not prompt any exceptional response ( being hyperendemic in that area), while in Nigeria the
outbreak triggered a stronger response, especially following the 2013-2016 Ebola outbreak. The
uncertainty decreases with time, reflecting the increasing number of detected cases and of fatal
cases out of the detected ones, which reduces the uncertainty in the estimation.
For Ebola in Sierra Leone (figure 2) we consider only the severe situation, as no information on
detection and the probability of natural recovery were available to the authors (vulnerability for
the general case can be readily estimated as soon as these data become available). Vulnerability
increased sharply during the 2015-2016 epidemic reaching a higher value than that estimated for
Lassa fever . To understand these patterns it is instructive to look at the number of detected and
recovered cases; as can be seen in Figure 3, the number of recovered cases was in general higher
in January-March 2015 compared to the value after July 2015, explaining the larger vulnerability
after July 2015. The reasons for the larger number of recovered cases in January-March 2015 are
not clear. Figure 4 shows the vulnerability of the different Nigerian administrative states to the
Lassa epidemic in 2017-2018; the figure also shows the burden of disease . The most vulnerable
states are not necessarily those with higher impact, for instance the state of Plateau is the most
vulnerable despite the relatively low burden of disease.
Discussion
Vulnerability is a complex concept and estimating its value is a highly dimensional problem
largely affected by a diverse range of cultural/anthropological, environmental, political and
socio-economic drivers [52,53]. Examples of these factors are perception of the disease,
urbanization, deforestation, infrastructures and services disruption, new technologies, climate,
weather, land use, resources to implement necessary programmes, etc. This poses enormous
challenges to measure and predict vulnerability, and to its understanding.
To overcame this problem we propose to focus on established definitions of impact, adaptive
capacity and therefore vulnerability. Accordingly, the impact was measured as the number of
infected cases and adaptive capacity as the number of recovered out of the diseased cases. An
important advantage of this approach is the simplicity of the functional forms of vulnerability,
especially when only one disease is considered. An other important benefit is that the expressions
for vulnerabilities, both for general and severe situations, are identical for several different
scenarios e.g. pure spillover and spillover with human-to-human transmission. It is important
to recognize, however, that the formulation of the model, and thus the specific functional form
of vulnerability, depends on the epidemiological scenario and specific problem that we want
to address. Guidance from other approaches such as expert opinion [6,10] and participatory
research [54,55] would be highly beneficial in identifying the scenario of interest and critically
scrutinize the analytical expression for vulnerability.
The analytical expressions for vulnerabilities for the relevant scenarios are the key result from
this work. We applied our analytical framework on Lassa fever and Ebola. As direct evidence on
key parameters was not available, we inferred them from data. As an illustrative example, the
probability of recovering following intervention γH was crudely estimated from the cumulative
number of detected and fatality cases. We would recommend however, moredetailed analyses [56]
to estimate the probabilities of recovering.
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Our approach can produce a time-dependent estimation of vulnerability as the epidemics
progress (as shown in figs. 1 and 2). An important difference between vulnerability to Lassa
fever and Ebola is the observed temporal trend of the estimations. In contrast with Lassa fever,
vulnerability to Ebola increases sharply as the epidemics progress followed by a plateau. It is also
important to note that the accuracy of estimates of vulnerability are expected to increase towards
the end of the epidemics, as the estimation of the probability of recovering following intervention
is more robust due to the larger samples.
Future development
Future development will extend our simple models to incorporate relevant factors describing
local heterogeneities to identify potential associations with the estimated vulnerability. For
instance, the probability of recovery from diseases due to intervention could be linked with
indicators such as proximity to health-care facilities, number of hospital beds, and others. In
turn, these factors could be associated with more general socio-economic factors such as literacy
rate, poverty rate, government expenditure on health, etc. Identifying the relevant indicators
and factors potentially affecting vulnerability is not a trivial task, especially as these factors are
often correlated ( [57] and references therein). Nevertheless, the formal incorporation of these
local heterogeneities in our analytical framework would allow prioritisation of vulnerability
predictors and support targeted investments. Institutions like the World Health Organization
require impartial measures to assess countries’ vulnerabilities to diseases to support strategic
decision making and allocate resources. As we showed that there are potential situations with
high vulnerability but low impact (e.g. compare the Nigerian states of Edo and Plateau). Instead
we envisage the need for an exhaustive framework that takes into account both impact and
vulnerability (despite vulnerability being a function of impact). Here we used Lassa fever
and Ebola as examples, but the generality of the approach clearly allows application to other
pathogens of humans, animal and plants. In order to produce robust estimates of vulnerability,
the method requires complete datasets of disease cases and mortality, ideally at high spatio-
temporal resolution, which is a prevailing problem for many neglected diseases and a challenge
for emerging ones. To identify the drivers of vulnerability, the method also requires linkage, at
high spatio-temporal resolution, between estimates of vulnerability at certain time and location
with potential predictors (e.g. environmental variables) which are not commonly available [57,58].
Sensitivity and resilience are also two important concepts related to vulnerability, which also
suffer from ambiguous definitions. Vulnerability can be formally and rigorously linked to
sensitivity by studying the dependence of vulnerability to relevant parameters (climate, hospital
facilities, poverty, literacy rate etc.) and explore how variations in these parameters differentially
impact on vulnerability. Low vulnerability can be achieved by the systemâĂŹs ability to adapt
to new threats, however this does not imply that the system remains unchanged. An additional
important tool, is a measure of the ability of the system to return to the same conditions before
a perturbation, such as an epidemic (resilience) [5], and how quickly the recovery process takes.
Stability analysis is an example of a theoretical approach that can be used to assess resilience, as
recently done in [59] where we identified the environmental conditions leading either to stable
oscillation in the mosquito population and prevalence of Rift Valley Fever, i.e. the eco-system is
resilient to control measures, (note that in this context the term resilience has a negative meaning
from a public health perspective), or to the extinction of the mosquitoes/infection. Understanding
and assessing health threats in the Anthropocene epoch requires an integration of theoretical
tools; vulnerability and resilience are promising examples of such tools.
3. Figures & Tables
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Figure 1. Time-depending vulnerability to Lassa fever for Sierra Leone (top) and Nigeria (bottom) during recorded
epidemics. Continuous dark red line: severe situations; grey area: 95% confidence interval for the severe situations;
continuous blue line: general situation; orange dashed-line: overall, crude estimate of vulnerability for severe situation
based on the information that the observed case-fatality rate among patients hospitalised with severe cases of Lassa fever
is 15% [41], i.e. V = 100/(100− 15); black dashed-line: overall, crude estimate of vulnerability for general situation
based on an overall case-fatality rate is 1% [41], i.e. V = 100/99. Data from the first month were removed to avoid































































Figure 2. Time-depending vulnerability to Ebola for Sierra Leone during recorded epidemics. Continuous dark red line:
severe situations; grey area: 95% confidence interval for the severe situations. Data from the first month were removed
to avoid potential death cases associated to infections occurred the month before and not detected.
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Figure 3. Cumulative number of detected and recovered Ebola cases in Sierra Leone. Data from the first month were
























































































































































































Figure 4. Number of confirmed cases (top) and vulnerability (bottom) for Lassa fever for different states in Nigeria based
on cases up to 22 April 2018. For some states (Abia, Benue, Enugu,Gombe, Kaduna, Lagos) the vulnerability was
undefined (as adaptive capacity was zero) and therefore not included in the analysis. The vertical lines represents the
95% confidence intervals.
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Full details of the mathematical model
Impact for pure spillover events (no human to human transmission)
Following [44], spillover events can be treated as a Poisson process, and that complex drivers
can be incorporated in the governing parameters, such as in the rate of the Poisson process.
Accordingly, we assume that a spillover is caused by independent random ‘contacts’ (mediated
by contaminated food, fomites etc.) between humans and reservoir. Thus the probability P that k
events occur during a time τ (e.g. number of admissions to hospital in one week) can be described





where λ is a parameter (rate) representing the expected number of zoonotic spillovers per time
unit. The parameter λ is expected to depend on other drivers [60]. In the simplest scenario
the human population is uniformly subjected to random and independent (direct or mediated)
contacts with the reservoir. Only a fraction of these contacts, equal to the infection prevalence of
the reservoir, are a potential source of infection. We also distinguish the detected infections from
the undetected ones. Accordingly, we assume:
λ= xNHηR(NR)PrR(NR)χR + (1− x)NHηR(NR)PrR(NR)χR =NHηR(NR)PrR(NR)χR (S2)
where x is the proportion of detected cases;NH is the human population size, e.g. the total number
of people in a village; ηR(NR) is a measure of exposure; PrR(NR) is the prevalence of the infected
reservoir; both exposure and prevalence are expected to depend on the reservoir population size
NR; χR is a parameter combining two complex mechanisms: the ability of the reservoir to excrete a
suitable dosage of the virus and the human response to it. We refer to this parameter as infection-
response efficiency. We assumed that all detected cases results in some intervention. Here we
assumed that the mechanism for detected and undetected is identical.
Adaptive Capacity for pure spillover events (no human to human transmission) with no
effects from previous cases
For the adaptive capacity we propose two measures:
• Adaptive Capacity for severe cases. People who naturally recovered are not taken into
account in the definition of adaptive capacity as they do not require costly resource such
as hospitalization. We made the underlying assumption that health seeking behaviour
occur only in severe cases. Asymptomatic cases, which as assumed to be not detected, are
not taken into account in the definition of adaptive capacity.
• Adaptive Capacity for general cases. People who naturally recovered are also taken into
account in the definition of adaptive capacity as the infection status will result in loss of
working days, personal cost for medicines etc. Asymptomatic cases are included among
the undetected cases.
Similarly, we assume that the probability of a person recovering is given by a Poisson process.
Adaptive Capacity for severe cases. In this case the rate φsev(t) of the Poisson process is given by:
φsev = xλγH (S3)
where γH is the probability that a person recovers following some kind of intervention (e.g.
treatment, hospitalization, other forms of healthcare aid), x is the proportion of detected cases.
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Adaptive Capacity for general cases. In this case the rate φgen(t) of the Poisson process is given
by:
φgen = (1− x)λγ + xλγH (S5)







(1− x)γ + xγH
(S6)
Impact and Adaptive Capacity for pure spillover events (no human to human
transmission) during a time T with variation in the number of susceptibles.
Impact
In the scenario above, we assumed that the number of susceptibles is constant. In a small
population, however, the depletion of susceptibles is expected to be an important effect that can
result in a self-constraining epidemic. Furthermore, the number of susceptible and infected can
change due to birth/death and or immigration/emigration.
Following [44] in the model (S1), we replaced the (fixed) size of the human population NH with
the (variable) number of susceptibles, SH . Thus, the probability of observing k cases at any time
tj during the interval [(j − 1)τ, jτ ] (with tj ∈ [(j − 1)τ, jτ ]) is the piecewise function defined on
discrete intervals:







where the time-dependent terms at time tj are estimated at the end of the previous interval [(j −
1)τ, jτ ]. As soon as spillover events start, part of the human population becomes infected; some
with resulting life-time immunity and others die. In a simple scenario (see details in [44]), the
number of susceptibles is:
SH(tj) =
{
NH − CH(tj) if NH >CH(tj)
0 otherwise
(S8)
where CH(jτ) represents the cumulative number of people who had been infected at any past
time during the interval [0, jτ ], irrespective of if they recovered or died. This corresponds to:
CH(tj) =CH(tj−1) + SH(tj−1)ηR(NR)PrR(NR)χRτ (S9)
The probability P (k, tj) at time tj in equation (S7) can be iteratively calculated by replacing
the susceptible and cumulative infected, SH and CH , with their explicit expressions given in
equations (S8) and (S9) estimated at the previous time tj−1.
Adaptive Capacity
We extend the adaptive capacity given in equation (S5), by letting it depending on the time
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φsevj = xλjγH (S10)
and
φgenj = (1− x)λjγ + xλjγH (S11)
Where the time step τ is chosen long enough so that most recovers at any time tj (φsevj and
φgenj ) out of new cases occurring at time tj−1 = tj − τ (λj ) happened during the time step τ . This
assumption, however, can be readily relaxed.
Vulnerability
Here we are interested to the vulnerability during a time T , therefore we need to consider the ratio



















[(1− x)γ + xγH ]CH(T )
=
1
(1− x)γ + xγH
(S13)
where the sum is performed from the starting point in time, 1, to the index n, so that T = tN .
Impact and Adaptive Capacity for spillover events with human to human transmission
during a time T
Let us suppose there there is a degree of human-to-human transmission as well as pure zoonotic
spillover, in this case the model (S7) is extended to include the contribution of human-to-human
transmission [44], that is:









PrH(NH , tj) =
IH(tj)
SH(tj) + IH(tj) +RH(tj)
(S14)
where ηH(NH) is the probability that a single person is in contact with any other member of the
human population per time unit; χH is the product of the probability that the virus is excreted
from a person and the probability that a person acquires infection when exposed to the virus;
PrH(NH) is the infection prevalence in the human population, which is the proportion of infected
members IH(tj) in relation to the total size of the current population, for an SIR-type of model
this can be written as: SH(tj) + IH(tj) +RH(tj) where RH(tj) is the number of recovered
individuals. SH(tj) is given by Eq (S8) with
CH(tj) =CH(tj−1) + E[P̂ (k, tj)] (S15)
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where E[P̂ (k, tj)] is the expected number of spillover events during the time-interval [(j −
1)τ, jτ ], leading to:
















SH(tj−1) + IH(tj−1) +RH(tj−1)
χHτ





H (tj) represents the cumulative number of infections up to time tj due to




H (tj) represents the cumulative number of infections up





RH(tj) = RH [tj−1] + γrIH [tj−1]τ
DH(tj) = DH [tj−1] + γdIH [tj−1]τ (S17)
where DH(tj) is the disease induced mortality, γr and γd are the recovery and mortality rates
respectively. Based on on the same arguments and assumptions discussed in the section (‘Impact
and Adaptive Capacity for pure spillover events (no human to human transmission) during a









(1− x)γ + xγH
(S19)
In some cases it might be convenient to explicitly separate the cumulative number of infections
up to time tj (CH(tj)) into the contribution due to animal-to-human, (CzoonH (tj)) from human-to-
human (Ch−hH (tj)) [44], i.e. For instance, the cumulative impact and cumulative adapting capacity












φsevj = [xγH ]
[

















φsevj = [(1− x)γ + xγH ]
[





The reason is that in general the environmental, socio-economic, etc. drivers affect the
two contributions CzoonH (T ) and C
h−h
H (T ) in a different way. Mathematically the functional
expression of CzoonH (T ) and C
h−h
H (T ) are two different functions of the relevant parameters,
allowing a more meaningful analysis, for instance if we are interested on the sensitivity of impact
and adaptive capacity on different parameters.
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Impact and Adaptive Capacity for more that one disease
Let us consider two diseases, then the same principle can be extended to more than two. For





















where SdisAH (tj) and S
disB
H (tj) are the number of people susceptible to the two diseases











same meaning of those in equations (S7) but specific of the two diseases.
The number of susceptibles are:
SdisAH (tj) =
{






NH − CdisBH (tj)− βCdisAH (tj) if NH >CdisBH (tj)− βCdisAH (tj)
0 otherwise
(S26)
where CdisAH (tj) and C
disB
H (tj) are the cumulative number of infections for the two diseases
respectively. The binary coefficients α and β can only assume values 0 and 1, thus α= 1 is the
scenario when being infected with diseaseB prevent further infection with diseaseA; in contrast,
α= 0 is the scenario when being infected with disease B does not affect the probability of being
also infected with disease A; similar arguments can be applied to β. We can also consider the
situation when the condition of being infected with disease B affect (either increases or decrease)
the probability of being also infected with disease A. In this case we would modify the the






























where xdisA and xdisB are the probabilities of detection for the two diseases, γdisA and γdisB
are the probabilities of natural recover without intervention for the two diseases and γdisAH and
γdisBH are the probabilities of recover following intervention.
Vulnerability
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which might need to be calculated recursively.
The expressions above can be re-written as:
V sev =
xdisAwA + xdisBwB





















































λdisBj represent the burden of disease A and B at
a certain point in time. If the number of detected cases are respectively DA and DB , then
DA ≈ xdisA
∑
λdisAj and DB ≈ x
disB
∑





















where xdisA and xdisB are the probability of detection for disease A and B respectively.
Extend the model to country level
The sum of two independent Poisson distributed random variables, with parameters λ1 and
λ2 is still a Poisson random variable with parameter λ1 + λ2. Therefore the derivations above
can be aggregated at country level. Thus the overall impact, at time tj , is Λj =
∑
λj(x, y)
where the argument (x, y) identify the particular high-resolution spatial unit, e.g. a village,
under investigation. Similarly the overall adaptive capacity Φgen =
∑
φgenj (x, y) and Φ
sev =∑
φsevj (x, y) the overall vulnerabilities are
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